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Abstract  
Accelerating innovation in clean energy technologies is a policy priority for governments 
around the world aiming to mitigate climate change and to provide affordable energy. Most 
research has focused on the role of governments financing R&D and steering market demand, 
but there is a more limited understanding of the role of direct government interactions with 
startups across all sectors. We propose and evaluate the value-creation mechanisms of 
network resources from different types of partners for startups, highlighting the unique 
resources of government partners for cleantech startups. We develop and analyze a novel 
dataset of 657 U.S. cleantech startups and 2,015 alliances with governments, firms, research 
organizations, and not-for-profit organizations from 2008 to 2012 and analyze short-term firm 
outcomes from the different alliances. Our findings highlight the importance of governmental 
partners in technology development alliances to catalyze cleantech startup innovation (the 
patenting activity of cleantech startups increases by 73.7 percent with every additional 
governmental technology alliance when compared to those startups that did not engage in 
such alliances) and as quality signals to private sector investors for licensing alliances (private 
financing deals increase by 155 percent for every additional license from a government 
organization). Overall, these findings extend the alliance perspectives on innovation, 
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contribute to the emerging research on entrepreneurial ecosystems, and underline the need to 
develop empirical evidence in different sectors. 
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1. Introduction 
Accelerating technological innovation in the energy sector—and particularly in the clean 
power and transportation, or cleantech sector—has become a public policy priority in countries 
around the world, as reflected in the 2015 Paris Agreement (UNFCCC, 2015b) and the recent IPCC 
Global Warming of 1.5°C report (IPCC, 2018). This is because mitigating global climate change, 
reducing local air pollution from fossil powered electricity and transportation, and providing 
reliable and affordable energy for all represent some of the most difficult challenges of the 21st 
century (United Nations, 2015). Prior research on how governments can promote technological 
innovation has identified two primary classes of governmental roles: the provision of public funding 
or incentives to lower the cost of research and development (R&D) in universities, research 
laboratories, or firms (or ‘technology push’), and the implementation of policies to increase the 
rewards to innovators by creating or shaping markets (or ‘demand pull’, which in the case of the 
cleantech sector includes feed-in-tariffs, tax credits, or carbon prices) (e.g., Bettencourt et al., 2013; 
Howell, 2017; Mowery and Rosenberg, 1979; Nemet, 2009; 2018; Schmidt and Sewerin, 2018). 
But more recently, researchers and governments alike have challenged the traditional role of 
government in supporting innovation. The rapid growth of startups, i.e., recently founded firms in 
their first years of existence, and the venture capital (VC) funding community since the 2000s in the 
United States (U.S.) initially in the information technology (IT) and biotech sectors, and later in 
cleantech (Gaddy et al., 2017) has raised questions on the extent to which governments are needed 
to create supportive conditions for technology startups to realize their potential (Guzman and Stern, 
2015; Samila and Sorenson, 2010). In parallel, new national energy innovation policies have been 
created to promote different types of interactions, or alliances, between the public and private 
actors in the U.S. and elsewhere (Anadon, 2012; Chan et al., 2017). Many of these new institutions 
to advance technology innovation in the cleantech space have increasingly focused on providing 
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incubator services to support startups (e.g., DOE, 2018b). There has also been significant action to 
better connect public and private R&D and startup funding activities at an international level.1 
However, to date there is little empirical research on the value of direct alliances between 
government organizations and cleantech startups to shape technological innovation in the energy 
space. 
Governments and startups have a contrasting, yet highly complementary, set of resources 
and priorities to foster R&D in the cleantech sector. Government organizations make up a 
significant fraction of total R&D efforts in most countries (Mazzucato, 2013). In the U.S. for 
example, publicly-funded agencies funded about 27% of all R&D in 2013 (NSF, 2016). There are 
several government organizations, which are defined as public agencies that have the mission to 
advance technological innovation and to contribute to technology transfer in the energy space either 
through funding, conducting, or supporting R&D (Anadon, 2012; Goldstein and Narayanamurti, 
2018).2 It has been argued that these publicly-funded organizations have the resources, the ability 
(e.g., critical mass), and the mandate to invest in or carry out efforts that could have payoffs in the 
longer term when compared to the efforts of private firms (Anadon et al., 2016; Westwick, 2003). 
For example, on average, each laboratory of the Department of Energy (DOE) involved in energy 
technology had an annual budget of 317 million USD for energy R&D in 2014, and they possess 
                                                           
1  For example, two high-level initiatives materialized with the Paris Agreement: Mission Innovation and the Breakthrough Energy 
Coalition (the first one led by national governments, the second by private actors, but with the idea of acting in concert). The 
Mission Innovation initiative comprises governments of 20 major global economies that pledged to accelerate public and private 
global clean technology innovation and to double their public R&D investments by 2020. The private sector’s Breakthrough 
Energy Coalition, initially comprising 27 private investors, committed to investing early in technologies that can help mitigate 
climate change and bring in long-term ‘patient’ capital investments to help accelerate the commercialization of the outputs from 
the Mission Innovation funding increase (UNFCCC, 2015a). 
2   In the U.S., these government organizations include (at the federal level) the Department of Energy (DOE), its seventeen national 
laboratories (sixteen federally funded R&D centers—FFRDCs—and one government owned and government operated center), 
and some of its new funding programs (including ARPA-E); other federal agencies, such as the National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration (NASA) and the Department of Defense; and state level agencies, such as the New York State Research and 
Development Agency (NYSERDA) (USA.gov, 2018). This definition of government organizations as publicly funded agencies 
with the mission to promote (energy) innovation does not include public and private universities as well as private research 
institutes. 
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unique demonstration and testing facilities (Bin-Nun et al., 2017). These organizations may possess 
important resources for cleantech innovation as a result of the multi-decade technology 
development cycles for energy supply technologies, the high capital intensity in the energy sector 
and path dependencies with existing fossil fuel-based infrastructures. Furthermore, unlike in the 
space or defense domains, where government organizations also play a pivotal role as the main 
customer (or market), the energy sector is largely in the hands of the private sector. This implies 
that the defense and space models of bridging technology-push and market-pull (largely through the 
role of the government as customer) are not directly applicable to the energy sector, where different 
types of instruments for addressing climate change and accelerating energy innovation are needed 
(Mowery et al., 2010). 
Compared to government organizations engaged in R&D and commercialization, startups 
are perceived to be agile and flexible with the ability to respond to market opportunities in the near-
term by commercializing novel solutions. These characteristics make startups particularly apt for 
the urgent solutions needed in the cleantech sector (e.g., Audretsch et al., 2006; Howell, 2017). 
However, startups experience resource constraints and operate under a short-term imperative for 
achieving successful outcomes (over 1–2 years) (Baum, 1996; Baum et al., 2000). The quickness 
and agility that startups can leverage in sectors with short development cycles (e.g., IT) (Bettis and 
Hitt, 1995) may be more challenging for cleantech startups due to the sector’s longer term 
technology development requirements and resource intensity as outlined above.  
Forming alliances to access critical and complementary resources is an important strategy for 
startups to overcome resource constraints and to achieve superior outcomes (Pfeffer and Salancik, 
1978). This importance of alliances as described by resource dependence theory (RDT) is supported 
by several streams of research including interorganizational alliances and knowledge, innovation, or 
entrepreneurial (eco-)systems, which often build on empirical research in the biotech, 
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manufacturing, or IT sectors. The typical suggestion is that firms should collaborate as much with 
as many diverse partners as possible to benefit from diverse knowledge channels and important 
network resources such as partners’ R&D capabilities or reputation (e.g., Adner and Kapoor, 2010; 
Autio et al., 2014; Clarysse et al., 2014; Iansiti and Levien, 2004; Lavie, 2006, 2007; Musiolik et 
al., 2012; Musiolik et al., 2018; Nemet, 2012; Nemet and Johnson, 2012; Powell et al., 1996). 
However, for startups to bring in and engage with diverse partners—when the partners have 
varying institutional norms, habits, and rules—may be challenging and sometimes infeasible given 
that startups face greater resource constraints than larger firms and that partnering is by itself a 
resource-intense endeavor (Laursen and Salter, 2006). The process of forming an alliance further 
produces “new patterns of dependence” (Hillman et al., 2009: 1405). Even though partnering with 
organizations that have the most critical and complementary resources might be important for 
achieving superior outcomes, private partners are typically powerful and often tend to benefit more 
from the relational and spillover rents than the focal firm (Katila et al., 2008; Lavie, 2006). Overall, 
resource-constrained startups need to be selective in their partner choice and determine (a) which 
partner possesses critical resources and (b) how they can appropriate value from the alliance. 
Extant research has overlooked three elements in this context. First, research has primarily 
focused on the role of larger firms, universities, or newer forms of intermediary organizations (such 
as accelerators) in shaping entrepreneurial ecosystems (e.g., Autio et al., 2014; Clarysse et al., 2014; 
Clayton et al., 2018; Iansiti and Levien, 2004), and often neglected the role of governments in 
directly promoting startup innovation through (1:1) alliances. Second, research has often 
overlooked the mechanisms of how startups can create value from network resources in different 
types of alliances—for example, startups may benefit differently from resource synergies and tacit 
knowledge exchanges in technology development alliances when compared to getting direct access 
to codified knowledge in the form of licensing alliances (Conti et al., 2013; Deeds and Hill, 1996; 
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Hsu and Ziedonis, 2013; Islam et al., 2018; Lavie, 2007). And third, literature on startups and 
alliances has relied on evidence mainly from the biotech and IT sectors, but recent research 
suggests there may be value in adding empirical evidence from the cleantech sector (Gaddy et al., 
2017). In cleantech, the role of the U.S. government organizations in particular and of other 
governments around the world is central to understanding the technologies we enjoy today. 
Determining the value of different exchanges for cleantech innovation thus requires extending 
research to include governments and other partners in distinct types of alliances while 
simultaneously focusing on “the importance of breadth and depth of external search to innovative 
performance within each channel or knowledge domain” (Laursen and Salter, 2006: 133).  
This paper addresses these knowledge gaps by answering the following questions: (a) What 
role do alliances with governments play in enabling cleantech startup innovation activity and in 
increasing the ability to attract financial investments when compared to other partners? (b) What are 
the mechanisms in technology development and licensing alliances through which startups create 
value and generate positive outcomes for startups? To address these questions, we develop a novel 
dataset of the global alliances of 657 U.S. cleantech startups that had been in existence for a 
maximum of five years from 2008 to 2012, and classify startup partners as government 
organizations, research institutes and universities, not-for-profit organizations, and other firms 
(startups and established firms). We focus on the value-creation mechanisms in licensing and 
technology development alliances as opposed to market-based alliances such as procurement 
because of the emphasis on technological advancements in the energy space and the fact that—
unlike in the defense industry—governments are not the primary customers (Mowery et al., 2010).3 
We posit that governmental partners hold discretion over particularly useful technological and 
                                                           
3  Market-based alliances such as procurement are included as controls and discussed in Section 5. 
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physical resources for cleantech startup innovation (Anadon, 2012; Bonvillian, 2014; Koonin and 
Gopstein, 2011). We argue that the network resources from technology development alliances with 
government partners are more valuable to cleantech startups in terms of short-term innovation 
outcomes (patenting activity) than those available from universities and private research institutes, 
or other firms. We further show that licensing alliances with government organizations enable 
access to important social resources that could enhance the legitimacy of startups and help in 
attracting financial investments (Islam et al., 2018). Overall, we provide novel evidence that the 
negative impact of power imbalance—where the stronger party appropriates more value than the 
smaller one, often prevalent in alliances between startups and other firms or other profit-oriented 
partners (Cox Pahnke et al., 2015; Gulati et al., 2011)—does not seem to apply to the case of 
cleantech startup alliances with government organizations because of the latter’s distinct mandate to 
promote (energy) innovation and technology transfer.  
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we review the literature and 
lay out our hypotheses. In Section 3 we present the dataset we develop and describe the methods 
used to analyze it, including various robustness checks. In Section 4 we present the key results and 
follow with a discussion of the implications for the academic literature in Section 5 and for public 
policy in Section 6. We conclude with limitations and directions for future research in Section 7.  
 
2. Theory and Hypotheses 
We review in turn the literature on alliances and the importance of network resources for 
startups. We then summarize the review to present our hypotheses. 
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2.1 Network resources for startup innovation and financial investments 
According to RDT, the formation of interorganizational alliances and the underlying access to 
critical resources serves as an important means for firms to reduce the uncertainty of their 
environment and to overcome the constraints imposed because of limited internal resources 
(Casciaro and Piskorski, 2005; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). Several separate streams of literature 
support this importance of developing co-evolving and mutually rewarding alliances and the need to 
secure access to critical network resources using macro- or systems-level and firm-level analyses.  
In macro-level analyses of (technological) innovation systems, interorganizational alliances 
represent one of many possible interactions among institutions and actors including governments, 
firms, and entrepreneurs (e.g., Bergek et al., 2008; Hekkert et al., 2007). Technological innovation 
systems (TIS) analysis highlights that, in addition to the financial and human resources of the 
individual actors and system resources such as the emergence of standards, network resources such 
as reputation, trust, and creation of shared goals from alliances are important for technology 
development (Musiolik et al., 2012; Musiolik et al., 2018). Moreover, research has highlighted the 
importance of knowledge spillovers from acquiring technological knowledge from diverse channels 
by analyzing patent citations, where citations external to the technological domain may have a 
stronger influence on innovation success (Nemet, 2012; Nemet and Johnson, 2012). 
In firm-level analyses, the literatures on interorganizational alliances and (knowledge, 
innovation, business, or entrepreneurial) ecosystems highlight that innovation is typically a result of 
alliances between different types of actors. These studies often rely on case study analysis, or local 
cluster analysis methods and have typically studied established firms and, occasionally, startups, 
universities, or research institutes (e.g., Adner, 2006; Adner and Kapoor, 2010; e.g., Autio et al., 
2014; Baum et al., 2000; Clarysse et al., 2014; Dyer and Singh, 1998; Iansiti and Levien, 2004; 
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Laursen and Salter, 2006; Powell et al., 1996; Von Hippel, 1978). Overall, research on alliances 
indicates that diversity of partner types is not only a typical characteristic of effective ecosystem 
development (Clayton et al., 2018), but also increases firm innovation and the likelihood of 
succeeding in the market (Demirkan and Demirkan, 2012; Laursen and Salter, 2006).  
However, the recommendation to collaborate as much with as many diverse partners as 
possible to benefit from network resources may not be feasible for startups in general and for 
cleantech startups in particular. As partners may have different institutional norms and practices, 
engaging productively with different types of partners requires time-intensive and costly 
organizational practices and coordination mechanisms (Laursen and Salter, 2014). For example, 
alliances with suppliers and customers typically require careful consideration of disclosure of 
knowledge on products and technologies and extensive mutual coordination and commitment (Dyer 
and Singh, 1998; von Hippel, 1988). In contrast, collaborating with a government organization, 
such as a U.S. national laboratory or a state-level energy agency, involves a different type of 
process that may require higher levels of bureaucracy, distinct cultural attitudes, contractual rules, 
and costs (Glauthier and Cohon, 2015). Bringing in a strong diversity in partners may therefore be 
particularly challenging for startups that are generally subject to greater resource constraints in 
terms of personnel or cash flow when compared to larger firms.  
Hence, resource-constrained startups need to be selective in their partner choice. In other 
words: “The organization can seldom dictate which resources its partners will own, but it can 
decide, to some extent, who to partner with” (Gulati et al., 2011: 215). To benefit from alliances, 
startups thus need to forge relations with those partners that have the greatest discretion over critical 
resources that complement the startup’s resource portfolio. Alongside physical products, these 
potentially valuable resources for startups include technological knowledge and social status or 
prestige (Hillman et al., 2009; Lavie and Drori, 2012; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). These resources 
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are specific to the structure and the actors of the sector in which the startup is active. As we discuss 
below, the literature shows that the energy sector, i.e., the context for cleantech startups, is 
significantly different from other sectors that have been the focus of most research on startup 
alliances to date. 
The structure of the cleantech sector is defined by three interrelated characteristics: (a) 
electricity and fuels are commodities that are often regulated, as electricity and transportation 
services are key to human well-being and the functioning of a state; (b) the rate of transformation in 
the energy sector infrastructure is slow since it takes multiple decades to develop and deploy new 
products for generating and storing different forms of energy; and (c) high capital intensity and 
lumpiness of investments, path dependencies, and lock-ins with existing fossil fuel-based 
infrastructures mean that changes in infrastructure and institutions are needed to make new energy 
sources available (Fouquet, 2013; Grubler et al., 2012; Koonin and Gopstein, 2011; Nanda et al., 
2015; Unruh, 2000). The valuable network resources required for cleantech startups may therefore 
be held by organizations that have a longer term perspective for their research activities, substantial 
and energy specific research experience, physical equipment and dedicated researchers, as well as 
the willingness to contribute to technology transfer to the private sector. In the cleantech sector, we 
can distinguish between three groups of actors: government organizations, private actors, and 
universities. Government organizations include government departments, such as the DOE, or the 
national laboratories, such as the National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL), owned by DOE 
and with particular missions including the long-term promotion of (energy) innovation and 
technology transfer in the case of the U.S. (e.g., Bin-Nun et al., 2017; Westwick, 2003). Public and 
private universities as well as private research institutes, such as MIT or the Western Research 
Institute, typically have a mandate for research, training, and education (e.g., American Academy of 
Arts and Sciences, 2013; Boccanfuso, 2010; Henderson et al., 1998). Private sector firms active in 
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the cleantech sector generally have the mandate to provide returns to stakeholders (e.g., Drucker, 
1958). In Table 1, we summarize the network resources from these three different actor groups that 
are potential alliance partners for cleantech startups.  
 
---------------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 about here 
---------------------------------- 
We link the different types of resources owned by the three actors (Table 1) to alliance types 
that enable positive outcomes for startups (i.e., increased innovation and financing) based on the 
three value-creation mechanisms proposed by Lavie (2007): (1) directly accessing technological 
resources in the form of codified knowledge through licenses that complement startup’s internal 
resources and might directly increase startup outcomes; (2) directly accessing physical and 
technological resources and transferring tacit knowledge in technology development alliances, 
which enables resource combinations and synergies between network and internal resources that 
together contribute to superior outcomes; and (3) facilitating indirect returns through knowledge 
spillovers that enable the internalization of external technological resources (in addition to the 
relational ones), or through legitimacy increases as a result of providing social resources such as 
trust and credibility (Lavie, 2007). We argue that knowledge spillovers and legitimacy increases 
might be prevalent in both licensing and technology development alliances. Overall, we posit that 
cleantech startups benefit especially from forming licensing and technology development alliances 
with government organizations as a result of greater resource complementarity and reduced power 
imbalance when compared to other partners. Figure 1 summarizes our theoretical model, which we 
further explain in the following.  
---------------------------------- 
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Insert Figure 1 about here 
---------------------------------- 
2.2 Importance of network resources from governmental partners for innovation 
Startups can create value from their alliances by directly acquiring codified knowledge from 
their partner(s) (Lavie, 2007). Licensing alliances with partners that possess critical resources 
enable direct access to technological knowledge in return for a fee or royalty. Prior research from 
the biotech sector has argued that the technological network resources transferred in licensing 
alliances with universities or research institutes are important for startup innovation, though to a 
lesser extent than technology development alliances (Baum, 1996; Baum et al., 2000; Liebeskind et 
al., 1996). In the cleantech space, government organizations manage and receive funding for 
conducting research over longer periods—sometimes even decades—when compared to universities 
or private research institutes and especially to private sector firms, thus possessing unique 
technological expertise in cleantech as well as in related technologies (Anadon, 2012; Bonvillian, 
2014). They have the specific mandate to promote discovery science, energy security and 
independence, national security, and economic prosperity and global competitiveness (DOE, 2017). 
In addition, these organizations often have a critical mass of researchers, i.e., a greater amount of 
dedicated personnel for (energy) innovation, with lower staff fluctuation when compared to 
universities and private research institutes, or private firms. Given that the development and 
deployment of new energy products often takes multiple decades and requires high capital intensity, 
government organizations have potentially built unique technological capabilities and a wide human 
and technological resource base spanning the energy space (Cohen and Noll, 1996; Koonin and 
Gopstein, 2011; Westwick, 2003). These network resources from government organizations thus 
bring in technological expertise on cleantech that may serve as key complements to the short-term 
outlook, agility, and market feedback of startups.  
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We suggest that network resources in the form of codified knowledge in licenses from 
government organizations are characterized by greater resource complementarity and may lead to 
more technological benefits that result in additional innovation activities than the ones from 
universities and private research institutes, or private sector firms. Private sector firms are profit-
driven and typically reluctant to share additional knowledge that bears the risk of reducing their 
own competitive advantage. While universities widely disseminate their knowledge and contribute 
to private sector innovation through spillovers (e.g., Henderson et al., 1998; Jaffe, 1989), 
publications rather than direct interactions with startups to transfer additional knowledge remain a 
priority. But rationales of knowledge spillovers also apply to government organizations—for 
example, Chan (2015) found that government laboratories’ licenses to private firms resulted in 
increased follow-on patenting activity of the licensee firms and in follow-on patenting at other 
firms. We argue that the spillovers from government organizations in the cleantech space may be 
larger (than with other partners) because they result from the internalization of additional 
technological knowledge that emerges from the more frequent and direct interaction with 
government personnel who facilitate the licensing process. Furthermore, licenses from government 
organizations may be acquired in areas beyond a firm’s own set of competencies (e.g., Arora, 
1995), which could be associated with a greater potential to learn and to generate subsequent 
innovation, at least on a longer term horizon.  
Thus, our first hypothesis is that for startups, government organizations are key partners 
(compared to universities and private research institutes as well as to private firms) that allow access 
to codified knowledge and to personal interactions, thus enabling startups to fully capture the value 
of licenses. Given startups’ resource constraints and the short-term imperative to achieve successful 
outcomes, licensing alliances with government organizations represent the lowest risk and, 
potentially, most valuable option for startups to generate value from technological resources.  
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Hypothesis 1: For startups in the cleantech sector, licensing alliances with government 
organizations are more positively associated with increases in patenting activity by the startup 
when compared to other alliance partners. 
Technology development alliances, such as when startups engage in joint R&D, 
demonstration, or testing activities with other partners, enable the sharing and exchange of tacit 
technological knowledge, the spreading of risk, and resource synergies between network and 
internal resources (Lavie, 2007). Prior research has shown how firms that forge technology 
development alliances with other firms, research institutes, or universities experience increased 
levels of innovation in terms of patenting activity or new product development (Clarysse et al., 
2014; Deeds and Hill, 1996). As indicated above, government organizations manage and receive 
funding for conducting energy research over longer periods when compared to other partners for 
cleantech startups. Various studies suggest that a range of energy technologies such as solar, energy 
efficiency, or fracking are hard to explain without the funding and collaboration activities of 
governments (Anadon et al., 2014; DOE, 2018a; Nordhaus et al., 2012; NRC, 2001). These 
activities supplemented and shaped those of private firms in a range of areas, including IT, defense, 
health, and energy (Mazzucato, 2013). In addition to these complementary technological resources, 
government organizations possess unique physical resources such as comprehensive demonstration 
and testing facilities for new technologies (Koonin and Gopstein, 2011) that are important for 
enabling experimentation. For example, the DOE national laboratories are stewards of around 30 
unique scientific instrumentation and research facilities, which require “major investments beyond 
the means of individual universities and firms” (DOE, 2017: 2). Technology development alliances 
with government organizations may thus enable access to complementary technological and 
physical resources that may not be available to cleantech startups otherwise. 
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While access to complementary resources is important for overall knowledge generation and 
relational returns that cannot be generated by a single party in the alliance (Dyer and Singh, 1998; 
Wright et al., 2004), the value appropriation mechanisms, i.e., the relative share of the relational 
returns, might differ significantly between partner types (Lavie, 2007). There is often an imbalance 
whereby high-margin partners that possess critical resources are typically more powerful and tend 
to benefit more from both the relational and spillover rents than the focal firm, especially in the case 
of startups (Katila et al., 2008; Lavie, 2006). In this context, the concept of power imbalance 
describes the power difference or ratio of power of the more to the less powerful actor (Lawler and 
Yoon, 1996). Thus, one may argue that power imbalance and the inherent costs of partnering with 
resource-rich firms may outweigh the benefits of alliances (Bae and Gargiulo, 2004; Casciaro and 
Piskorski, 2005), which can lead to declining performance of the smaller party (Lavie, 2007). In 
addition, conflict over knowledge and concerns about appropriability is widely considered a barrier 
to alliances with larger, powerful partners. For example, strict regulations from the legal 
departments, complex negotiations, compounded with mechanisms to ensure secrecy may restrict 
emergent alliances (Laursen and Salter, 2014). In the case of universities or private research 
institutes, the incentive to publish the results of the technology development alliance either in the 
form of a research paper or in a press announcement for publicity (American Academy of Arts and 
Sciences, 2013) can conflict with non-disclosure developments or the securing of jointly-developed 
knowledge in the form of patents. In contrast, government organizations are explicitly mandated to 
contribute to knowledge and technology transfer to private firms (DOE, 2014).4  
Thus, our second hypothesis is that for startups, government organizations are important 
partners (compared to universities and private research institutes as well as to private firms) that 
                                                           
4  For example, in the U.S., the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980 was put in place to promote private sector development and 
commercialization of government funded R&D by facilitating licenses of patents obtained with government-funded research by 
private firms (Schacht, 2009). 
Accepted in Research Policy - February 2019 
17 
provide access to unique physical resources such as testing facilities, to technological resources 
such as knowledge and expertise on related technological areas or on pursuing demonstration 
activities for new technological developments. This greater resource complementarity combined 
with the reduced power imbalance of government partners when compared to private sector firms 
suggests that technology development alliances with government organizations potentially represent 
the most valuable option for startups to generate value from technological and physical resources 
through joint technology development. Thus: 
Hypothesis 2: For startups in the cleantech sector, technology development alliances with 
government organizations are more positively associated with innovation activity by the 
startup when compared to other alliance partners. 
2.3 Importance of network resources from governmental partners for financial investments 
In addition to providing access to valuable technological and physical resources, alliances 
with government organizations may also provide access to critical social resources, such as 
increased credibility or status. These network resources are important for startups to increase their 
legitimacy in the eyes of external stakeholders and overcome their liabilities of newness (Hillman et 
al., 2009; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). In particular, investors face high levels of uncertainty in 
evaluating startups, especially in emerging industries such as cleantech, where prospective investors 
have less experience and the remedies of their investments have been less effective than in other 
sectors such as biotech (Gaddy et al., 2017). Research has found that codified knowledge in the 
form of startup licenses from key partners can have important signaling effects for private sector 
investors (Conti et al., 2013; Hsu and Ziedonis, 2013).  
The importance placed on a signal comes from its ability to resolve a critical uncertainty 
about the startup's prospects and its likelihood to realize successful market outcomes such as 
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introducing required products and technologies (Islam et al., 2018). Investors thus often rely on 
signals such as patents or other codified forms of knowledge to assess the prospects of potential 
portfolio companies (Laursen and Salter, 2014). Engaging in a licensing alliance with a 
governmental partner who has a strong reputation to commercialize a specific technology can thus 
represent a feasible strategy for startups to convince potential investors about its promising 
prospects (Booker et al., 2012), given the perceived ability of startups to use an existing 
technological knowledge base and directly transfer it into new products or technologies. 
Furthermore, particularly important for the energy sector is the fact that such licensing alliances 
enable access to dedicated researchers at government organizations who can advise startups on 
complementary technologies or on future developments (Nemet, 2012). Therefore for investors, 
licensing alliances may enable more accurate assessments of the startups’ technological prospects.  
Whereas prior research has found that “partners that possess the most valuable resources are 
not necessarily the finest associates” and “may be well positioned to appropriate the lion’s share of 
relational rents” (Lavie, 2007: 1207), just like in the previous hypothesis, we argue that even though 
government organizations may possess the most valuable resources for cleantech startups, the 
negative consequences of alliances from power imbalances are significantly reduced because of 
their distinct mandate and underlying incentives when compared to private sector firms, universities 
and research institutes as outlined above. Overall, this might increase the startup’s legitimacy vis-à-
vis potential investors. Given these arguments, we propose testing a third hypothesis:   
Hypothesis 3: For startups in the cleantech sector, licensing alliances with government 
organizations are more positively associated with increases in private financial investments 
in the startup when compared to other alliance partners.  
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The excellent technical reputation of government organizations combined with their ability to 
provide direct access to critical technological and physical resources through technology 
development alliances when compared to universities and private research institutes may further 
provide an important quality signal to investors and capital markets. Prior research suggests that 
technology development alliances not only increase startup performance in terms of sales or net 
income to sales ratio (Hagedoorn and Schakenraad, 1994; Lechner et al., 2006), but can also 
provide signaling effects of connectedness to key partners (Stuart, 2000). In emerging sectors like 
cleantech, there is a stronger need for startups to engage in relationships that help to minimize 
information and experience deficits of financial investors (Rawhouser et al., 2016). Signals such as 
technology development alliances with partners who have a reputation for technology expertise 
may help boost the reputation of the startup itself to investors (Islam et al., 2018). Potential 
investors from the private sector, i.e., VCs or banks, may also value the longer term time frame that 
is inherent in technology development alliances between governmental partners and startups when 
compared to other partner types. The political mandate of governments of focusing on energy 
innovation and on more radical, and therefore also more risky, technology developments (Leyden 
and Link, 2015; Mazzucato, 2013) could further be important to potential investors.  
Investors potentially value that the tacit knowledge exchanged in technology development 
alliances with government organizations, when compared to private firms, lower the risk of 
information leakages and knowledge outflows to competitors. Knowledge outflows represent a 
serious threat to startups that typically depend on single technologies and products. Even though 
these threats can be reduced through non-disclosure agreements and other formal mechanisms to 
ensure intellectual property (IP) ownership, research suggests that information can leak to 
competitors via shared intermediaries (Cox Pahnke et al., 2015). While alliances with governmental 
partners also bear the risk of information outflows to competitors who collaborate with the same 
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agencies, governments may be less inclined to behave opportunistically by leaking knowledge to 
competitors as they are—unlike firms—not profit-driven and—unlike universities and private 
research institutes—not incentivized above all to publish their research results. Overall, based on 
the preceding arguments, we propose a fourth hypothesis:  
Hypothesis 4: For startups in the cleantech sector, technology development alliances with 
government organizations are more positively associated with private financial investments in 
the startup when compared to other alliance partners.   
 
3. Dataset and Methods 
3.1 Data and measures 
3.1.1 Description of the U.S. cleantech startup dataset 
To test the hypotheses, we constructed a novel and unbalanced panel of 657 startups in the 
cleantech sector between 2008 and 2012. The panel includes 2,015 alliances (2008 to 2012) of all 
U.S. startups interacting with other firms, government organizations, research institutes, 
universities, and other not-for-profit organizations from the U.S. and globally (see Section 3.2.1 for 
details).  
The startups operate in one or more of the following 17 sub-sectors: solar, wind, biomass, 
geothermal, hydro and marine power, nuclear, energy storage, smart grid, energy efficiency, 
advanced materials, transportation, biofuels and biochemicals, conventional fuels, fuel cells and 
hydrogen, air, recycling and waste, or water and wastewater. We considered a firm to be a startup if 
it is younger than 5 years in year t, with t0 being 2008. 66 percent of the startups were founded 
before t0, and 34 percent entered our sample during the reported period. It provides very granular 
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and time-resolved information about the type of startup partner, the type of startup alliance, and 
basic firm information regarding size, age, location, and sector.  
We assess the outcomes of alliances that took place in 2008-2012, i.e., following the global 
financial crisis of 2007-2008. In this period, government recovery programs like the American 
Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 provided support for cleantech and other sectors while 
private sector VC transactions in ‘hardware’ cleantech startups remained high (Anadon et al., 
2017). 5 We overall capture a period of thriving public and private resources for startups. To ensure 
that our results are robust to the variation of resources in our dataset during the period of evaluation, 
we include year fixed effects (2008-2012) in all of our statistical models.  
We obtained the base data on the alliances of U.S. cleantech startups from the i3 Cleantech 
Group database. This relatively new database has hardly been used for research purposes in the past 
(see Zobel et al., 2016, for an example in the US solar industry) and is, to the best of our 
knowledge, the richest and most thorough collection of information on the global cleantech sector. 
It applies various mechanisms to collect information on firms, alliances between firms, industry 
development, and investments and this information is regularly updated and checked either by a 
research team or directly by the firms (i3 Cleantech Group, 2015). Information on alliances includes 
the names of the partners, alliance types, a brief description of the purpose and goal of the alliance, 
and the source. Furthermore, information for all potential types of partners is collected using the 
same method, which implies that alliances with government organizations are certainly not 
                                                           
5  Some of this government support included significant increases in DOE funding for applied R&D programs in the cleantech space, 
including work in the laboratories. In particular energy R&D funding for the technologies included in our cleantech database (i.e., 
renewable power, bioelectricity and biofuels, industrial, buildings and vehicle efficiency, transmission, distribution and storage) 
increased from around $1.0 billion in 2008 to $3.9 billion in 2009 (spent over two years), with appropriations in 2010 and 2011 
stabilizing around $1.5 billion and in later years to $1.7 billion (Anadon et al., 2017).  
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overrepresented in the sample. i3 Cleantech Group provided us with the startup names and alliance 
information for the whole cleantech sector.  
Two researchers in our team independently conducted manual verifications of all pieces of 
information covered by the database. We further expanded our dataset to include detailed 
information for each startup on location, patents, and financial investments by using multiple data 
sources (e.g., Orbis, FactSet, Thomson One, Derwent Innovation Index). As a result of this 
triangulation, we are reasonably confident that our sample of U.S. cleantech startups is 
comprehensive and does not systematically exclude particular types of startups collaborating in 
technology development and licensing (i.e., there is no selection bias in the startups included in the 
sample). Details on each of these independent and dependent variables, and how they were 
operationalized for our statistical analysis, are described in the next Sections 3.2-3.4. To examine 
the impact of the type of partner and the type of alliance on the dependent variables (innovation 
activity and financial investments), we used the Stata (14) software. 
3.2 Independent variables 
3.2.1 Type of partner 
Startups can collaborate or set up alliances with different types of partners. As described in 
Section 3.1, we categorize these partners into five categories: other firms; government 
organizations, laboratories, or agencies; universities and private research institutes; NGOs or 
environmental groups; and other public partners. These different partners of U.S. cleantech startups 
types include organizations from the U.S. and as well as from other countries.  
Again, two researchers in our team independently coded all of the startup partners by using 
additional information such as webpage research of the respective partner. In doing so, the 
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researchers coded government organizations as those public agencies with the goal to advance 
technological innovation and to contribute to technology transfer in the energy space either through 
funding, conducting, or supporting R&D (Anadon et al., 2016; Bin-Nun et al., 2017; Goldstein and 
Narayanamurti, 2018). In contrast, public and private universities and private research institutes 
constitute a separate category. In the rare case of inconsistent coding between the two researchers, 
additional webpage checks helped for reaching consensus. This independent exercise of double-
coding partners resulted into (i) 2,093 firms (803 young cleantech firms (younger than 10 years) 
and 1,290 other private sector businesses), (ii) 54 government organizations (e.g., DOE, DoD) and 
governmental laboratories or agencies (e.g., NREL, Fraunhofer), (iii) 78 universities (e.g., MIT or 
Princeton University) and private research institutes (e.g., Rocky Mountain Institute), (iv) 9 NGOs 
or environmental groups (e.g., Sierra Club), or (v) 43 other public partners (e.g., cities or schools). 
We attached the full list of non-firm partners to allow replicability of our findings in the attached 
Supplementary Information (SI) file.  
3.2.2 Type of alliance 
We built on the initial classification of the type of alliance provided in the i3 Cleantech Group 
database to develop our research. Two researchers in our team independently assessed the 
description provided by the i3 database and classified the alliances into five different types: 
technology development, licensee (i.e., when the startup obtains the license), procurement alliance, 
licensor (i.e., when the startup provides the license), and project development alliances (see Table 
2). This independent exercise of double-coding alliances into different types resulted in the re-
coding some of the classifications to ensure a consistent matching of the 2,015 alliances (2008 to 
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2012). We used technology development and licensee as the independent variables and used the rest 
of the types of alliances as controls.6  
---------------------------------- 
Insert Table 2 about here 
---------------------------------- 
3.2.3 Duration of alliances 
Estimating the duration of various alliances in our database was necessary for fully 
understanding their impact. Even though alliances between partners typically last for more than one 
year, duration data is rarely reported. Prior research based on networks of established firms has 
assumed durations of between one and five years, relying mostly on three years (e.g., Choi and 
Anadón, 2014; Schilling and Phelps, 2007). In contrast, we took a more conservative approach for 
our startup context and tested the robustness of our results to different assumptions regarding the 
average duration of alliances: either two years (i.e., 2008-2009, …, 2011-2012) or three-years (i.e., 
2008-2010, …, 2010-2012). We used these two- or three-year moving windows for annual 
measures to account for the impact of prior (including pre-sample) alliances and their cumulative 
nature (Robinson and Stuart, 2007; Schilling and Phelps, 2007). Given that the two-year duration is 
more relevant in the short-term oriented context of startups, we report the results on the two-year 
duration of the alliances in Section 4. 
3.2.4 Network measures for alliances 
We used the network measure of degree centrality to illustrate patterns in each two-year 
window for each type of partner and type of alliance. The degree centrality for each startup captures 
the number of connections of a particular node (firm). We counted the number of alliances for each 
                                                           
6  Please note that we briefly discuss the results on these additional alliance types, especially between startup outcomes 
and procurement alliances, in Section 5. 
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two-year window in two ways: (i) we counted the number of alliances for each type of partner, and 
(ii) more granularly, we counted the type of alliance per type of partner (see Figure 2 for an 
overview of governmental partners and Figure 3 for the overall network).7 By counting the number 
of alliances, degree centrality is the simplest network measure that allows more intuitive 
interpretation of results. We checked the validity of the degree centrality measures by also 
evaluating eigenvector centrality as another important network measure. Eigenvector centrality 
captures patterns in a broader network by assigning weights to each alliance based on the centrality 
measures of the partner (Bonacich, 2007). An alliance with a well-connected partner in the 
strongest network thus has a higher weight than alliances with a weakly-connected partner 
(Bonacich, 1987; Schilling and Phelps, 2007). We provide the (almost identical) results for 
eigenvector centrality in the SI file (see Table 7 in SI file), but focus on degree centrality in the 
following for reasons of simplicity. We used the “igraph” package in R to calculate these network 
measures (Csardi and Nepusz, 2006; R Core Team, 2015). 
------------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 2 and 3 about here 
------------------------------------------ 
3.3 Dependent variables 
3.3.1 Patenting activity 
To examine the impact of different types of partners and alliances on startup innovation 
activity, we use patents as a measure of technology innovation (or technological change) that is 
validated in an external examination process (Griliches, 1990). Although using patents to measure 
innovation activity or knowledge creation is not without challenges—for example, the propensity to 
                                                           
7  For example, when a startup was engaged in a technology development alliance with one government partner and three firms in 
2010 and had no alliances in 2011, the measure for government technology development alliances for the specific startup is one for 
2010 and 2011; and for startup alliances with firms it is three for 2010 and 2011.  
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patent and overall patenting activity might vary between industries (Levin et al., 1987)—it is a 
commonly used measure of innovation in the context of startups (e.g., Clarysse et al., 2014; Howell, 
2017). This seems to be particularly true in our empirical setting as the patenting propensity of U.S. 
cleantech startups has been found to be very high. Patents are generally more important in sectors 
with longer product life cycles (e.g., energy) when compared to more dynamic sectors (e.g., IT). In 
contrast to established firms, startups experience more challenges when innovating, where 
knowledge outflows do not only reduce profit levels but can threaten their survival. This is because 
startups typically depend on single products or services and cannot rely on a product portfolio for 
securing their survival. Therefore, the relatively cheap and standardized process to secure 
knowledge in the form of patents might be important to resource-constrained startups. In addition, 
patents can be a means to overcome the so-called ‘liability of newness’ in providing important 
signals to potential investors and helping in securing private funding (Booker et al., 2012; Conti et 
al., 2013; Hsu and Ziedonis, 2013). Thus, given the newness and stronger vulnerability, cleantech 
startups have an inherent interest to secure their innovative knowledge, which is why patenting 
activity represents a relevant measure for startup innovation. 
We use the number of patent applications for firm i in year t as a proxy for innovation efforts. 
As we discuss in Section 3.4.4, we also report the statistical results controlling for the 17 sub-
sectors to account for differences in patenting propensity and potential variation in patent value 
across cleantech sub-sectors (Trajtenberg, 1990). The annual patent applications were extracted 
from the Derwent Innovations Index database in their year of priority application.  
To further assess the robustness of our analysis for alternative measures of innovation that 
might better account for innovation quality, we collected patent forward citation data. We extracted 
the total citations for the patent applications of each firm using The Lens open-source patent 
database until September 2018. As shown in Table 1 in the attached SI file, the results using patent 
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citations instead of patent counts are almost identical. We also calculated the same models by 
including a linear depreciation of 1 based on the linear decreasing graph of U.S. patent citation over 
time from Jaffe and Trajtenberg (1996), as well as an annual 10% and 20% decrease, which again 
provided almost identical results to the models without depreciation.8 Given the importance and 
experience of using patenting activity as a measure of startup innovation, the fact that patenting 
itself is seen as an important outcome to attract investments, and considering some of the 
disadvantages of patent citations (e.g., dependence on examiner (for a recent overview and best 
practices, see Jaffe and de Rassenfosse (2017)), we focus on patenting activity in the following 
sections.  
3.3.2 Private financing deals 
We used the number of annual financing deals that each startup acquired per year to evaluate 
the signaling effects of alliances on investors. Financing deals are regularly applied to measure 
performance effects of startups because alternative measures such as employee or sales growth are 
often not available or informative as a result of the startups’ newness. This outcome variable is 
especially relevant in studies on distinct strategies for startups to leverage the likelihood of 
attracting investments and to evaluate which of these actions serve as relevant signals to investors 
(see, for example, recent research by Howell (2017); Islam et al. (2018); Kerr et al. (2014)). The 
financing deals were collected and aggregated from the Thomson One, FactSet, and i3 Cleantech 
Group databases, and primarily encompassed VC funding at different stages (seed, series A, B, etc.) 
as well as other private investments (loans, bonds, etc.). To assess the robustness of the financing 
deals variable and to rule out potential concerns of including less successful startups with many but 
smaller financial rounds, we collected data on the investment amounts in USD per deal. We were 
                                                           
8  These results are available upon request from the authors. 
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able to obtain information for 72.9% of the financing deals included in our sample.9 The positive 
and highly significant correlations between investment deals and (a) total investment amount, (b) 
average investment amount, (c) average amount divided by firm size (see SI file, Table 2) provide 
support for our chosen variable.  
We further included a measure of firm growth to check the robustness of the private financing 
deals variable. We measured firm growth as the likelihood of achieving a desired growth outcome, 
i.e., an IPO or an acquisition (excluding bankruptcies or liquidity constraints), within six years after 
the startup was founded (e.g., applied by Guzman and Stern, 2015). The data on firm growth was 
collected from various sources, including the i3 Cleantech Group and the FactSet database, and 
manually verified through a web search. Growth was operationalized as a binary variable equaling 1 
for an acquisition or IPO in year t, and 0 otherwise. 
3.4 Control variables 
3.4.1 Pre-sample patents 
To account for the diminishing importance of earlier knowledge, we included the pre-sample 
patent stock as a control variable, annually depreciated at a rate of 15 percent (e.g., Popp, 2004; Qiu 
and Anadon, 2012). Following Schilling and Phelps (2007), we included the annually depreciated 
value of pre-sample patents (before 2008) to control for unobserved heterogeneity in firm patenting 
activity.  
3.4.2 Prior private financing deals 
We controlled for the impact of private investments by including the number of prior 
financing deals of each startup for each year. We applied an annual depreciation rate equal to the 
                                                           
9  Information on the magnitude of financing deals is inherently sensitive, which is why it is often not consistently available–in 
contrast to the general information that a deal has been acquired (Howell, 2017). 
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one we used for prior patents (i.e., 15 percent) to account for the diminishing importance of 
financial investments over time.  
3.4.3 Prior public financing deals 
Similar to measuring prior private financing deals, we included a measure that accounted for 
whether the startup received prior grants or other forms of financial support from public sources. As 
an additional robustness check and acknowledging the central role of the DOE, we compiled 
information on the number of DOE grants or other types of financial support that the startups might 
have received in the examined period. We obtained the data from the USA Spending database and 
counted the number of financing deals per startup. Overall, 78 of the 657 cleantech startups in our 
sample (i.e., 12 percent of our sample) had received one or more DOE grants or other forms of 
financial assistance (including direct payments or reimbursements). The two variables show a 
positive, highly significant correlation (r = 0.054, p-value = 0.002). 
3.4.4 Sub-sector, age, and size 
We extracted firm-level information on sub-sector, age, and size from the i3 Cleantech Group, 
FactSet, and Orbis databases, and complemented and verified all information in a web search. We 
included industry fixed effects for the 17 sub-sectors in our statistical models. Figure 4 shows the 
average number of patents per sub-sector. We measured firm size by the number of employees, and 
age by including the time interval since the founding year.  
---------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 4 about here 
---------------------------------- 
Accepted in Research Policy - February 2019 
30 
3.4.5 Location 
We accounted for the geographic location of the U.S. cleantech startups, particularly in 
regional hotspots. For example, the Silicon Valley and San Francisco area are together home to 158 
of the 657 (i.e., 24 percent of our sample) cleantech startups. We examined whether firms that are 
located in geographically dense areas have higher propensities to innovate or to attract financial 
investments. We collected information on firm addresses from the i3 Cleantech Group, FactSet, and 
Orbis databases, and mapped the zip codes to the respective Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) 
for 2011. We captured the variance in the concentration of cleantech startups in the different MSAs 
by using the percentage of total firms located in the respective MSA (for a similar approach, see, for 
example, DeCarolis and Deeds, 1999; Folta et al., 2006). As shown in Figure 5, around 40 percent 
of the firms are located in the San Francisco-Oakland-Fremont, Boston-Cambridge-Quincy, New 
York-Northern New Jersey-Long Island, San Jose-Sunnyvale-Santa Clara, and Los Angeles-Long 
Beach-Anaheim regions, and the rest of the firms are spread across the country or located in smaller 
regional hubs. As expected, the San Jose-Sunnyvale-Santa Clara area is among the highest in 
average patents per firm.  
---------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 5 about here 
---------------------------------- 
3.5 Robustness checks  
We address potential concerns that some of the effects we estimate on the impact of 
partnering with governments on patenting activity and financial investments are driven by those 
firms that have higher ‘ability’ through quantitative and qualitative arguments. Quantitatively, we 
assess the robustness of our results using an instrumental variable regression (IV) analysis with the 
membership of U.S. Senators and Congressmen that represent the Congressional District or State of 
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the startup in relevant cleantech (Sub-) Committees as an instrument for government alliances 
(Gruber and Hungerman, 2007; Knight, 2002; Stock and Watson, 2007). In addition, we use 
propensity score matching (PSM) based on age, size and location (Abadie and Imbens, 2016). The 
two empirical strategies are briefly discussed in Section 4.2 and described in detail in the SI file.  
We also point out qualitatively that our results are less prone to endogeneity concerns because 
of the arguments that governments (a) should not try to pick winners to secure their own funding 
prospects and (b) might not have the ability to do so even if they wanted to.  
Government organizations have an inherent interest to promote energy innovation by 
partnering with a broad set of private partners—and not just the most successful ones—because if 
they are perceived as stepping too far into applied R&D (doing things that are not risky enough and 
that the private sector or other investors would be supporting anyway), they are likely to face 
backlash in Congress and funding cuts. A statement from the Chairman of the U.S. House 
Committee in Science, Space and Technology in 2015, Rep. Lamar Smith is representative of the 
concerns of the legislative branch regarding picking winners: “over the last decade, there has been 
unjustified growth in spending on late stage commercialization efforts within EERE. This bill 
refocuses DOE's work on basic R&D efforts, not subsidies” (Ling, 2015). Some at DOE and 
elsewhere believe that, in spite of the technology transfer mandate, there needs to be some 
disconnect between DOE and the private sector, arguing that the laboratories first purpose is to 
serve the needs of basic research and to establish a shared knowledge base, making it inappropriate 
for the laboratories to only provide support for a private sector interested in proprietary knowledge 
with only privately appropriable benefits. Interviews discussed in Logar et al. (2014) show that this 
need to balance is very present in minds and decisions about time and effort allocation of the 
scientists in government organizations.  
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 Furthermore, recent research on the impact of government subsidies has found that they are 
additional to startups but lead to a substitution for larger firms or in the context of subsequent larger 
grants after the more binding resource constraints are removed (Howell, 2017; Pless, 2018). Howell 
(2017) further found in a regression discontinuity design on ranked applicants to the Small Business 
Innovation Research (SBIR) grant program, that the rankings in small firm funding rounds were not 
predictive of their subsequent outcomes. This indicates that even if government organizations 
would try to pick winners, they might not have the ability to do so when controlling for observable 
characteristics (e.g., prior patents, financing deals).  
 
4. Results 
4.1 Main findings 
A summary of the descriptive statistics for the 657 startups in our sample, averaged over time, 
is provided in Table 3 and of the correlations in Table 4. Our dependent variables (patenting activity 
and financing deals) are not highly correlated with any of the other variables. The startups in our 
sample introduced an average of 1.40 patents every year and, on average, attracted more than one 
financing deal every two years (mean = 0.64 per firm-year). Overall, while all our startups had 
alliances in at least one of the four two-year windows (2008–2009, …, 2011–2012), 13.52 percent 
of the startups collaborated with at least one government organization. 
------------------------------------------- 
Insert Tables 3 and 4 about here 
------------------------------------------- 
We analyze the data with negative binomial regressions for the count variables—patenting 
activity and financing deals—because of overdispersion. We use robust standard errors and include 
time and sector fixed effects in our models. For each outcome variable, we calculated three different 
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models: Models 1 and 2 for the overall impact of the controls and partner type variables 
respectively, and Model 3 for the granular separation in alliance types per partner. The estimates for 
industry and time period effects are, although estimated, not reported to conserve space. Table 5 
reports the estimated coefficients of the negative binomial regression models on patenting activity 
and on private financing deals. Overall, the results for patenting activity in Model 2 indicate that 
compared to alliances with all other types of partners (i.e., universities or research institutes, not-
for-profit partners, other public organizations, and other startups or established firms), only 
alliances with government organizations are significantly associated with higher startup patenting 
activity (β = 0.284, p-value = 0.047, Model 2). As negative binomial regressions model the log of 
incident counts, this estimate implies that one additional alliance with a governmental partner is 
associated with a 32.9 percent increase in patenting activity (IRR = 1.329, eβ). Model 3 provides the 
results for the hypotheses.  
Licensing alliances with governmental partners are not more strongly associated with 
patenting activity, which is why we do not find support for Hypothesis 1 (H1). As hypothesized in 
H2, we found that technology development alliances significantly increase patenting activity (β = 
0.552, p-value = 0.010, Model 3), which is the strongest increase when compared to technology 
development alliances with firms (β = 0.218, p-value = 0.000, Model 3) and universities and private 
research institutes (not significant). This implies a 73.7 percent increase in patenting activity with 
every additional governmental technology alliance (IRR = 1.737) compared to a 24.4% increase 
with every firm technology alliance (IRR = 1.244). Licensing alliances with government partners 
are associated with strongest increases in financing deals (β = 0.935, p-value = 0.009, Model 3) 
when compared to licensing alliances with firms (not significant) and universities and private 
research institutes (not significant), suggesting support for H3. Every additional license from a 
governmental agency is associated with a 155 percent increase in financing deals (IRR = 2.546). 
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Even though the association between government technology alliances and financial deals is 
positive, it is not significant, which does not support H4.  
---------------------------------- 
Insert Table 5 about here 
---------------------------------- 
4.2 Additional analysis 
To check the robustness of our results and to rule out alternative explanations, we specified 
several alternative econometric models that revealed similar results, which are included in the SI 
file. Models using patent citations instead of patent activity revealed almost identical results (see 
Table 1 in SI file), highlighting the importance of government technology alliances for patent 
citations of the startups. Moreover, a binary variable to test whether the startups achieved a growth 
outcome (IPO or acquisition within 6 years after founding) in a logit regression revealed similar 
results to the private financing deals models (see Table 8 in SI file). We further tested eigenvector 
centrality as a more complex alternative network measure for degree centrality (i.e., the network 
measure we applied to calculate the alliances of startups as described in Section 3.2.4), which also 
revealed similar results for both outcome variables (see Table 7 in SI file). 
Furthermore, as indicated in Section 3.5, we applied two additional strategies to address 
potential concerns of having better firms (which may have better innovation outcomes anyway) 
partner more with government organizations. These strategies (IV and PSM) are briefly described 
below and in more detail in the SI file.  
We used the binary variables, House and Senate members of the startups’ Congressional 
District (House) or State (Senate) per year as instruments for governmental alliances and calculated 
IV OLS regressions to test instrument relevance and exogeneity. We performed a Durbin and Wu-
Hausman test of exogeneity after the 2SLS regression. Both tests are insignificant (see Table 4 in SI 
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file), which indicates that our variables are exogenous (e.g., Baum et al., 2003). However, the F-
Statistic for evaluating the strength of the instrument is 3.45 for patenting activity and 3.51 for 
financial deals (see Table 3), indicating that committee membership is a weak instrument (Stock 
and Watson, 2007). Because our two dependent variables (patenting activity and financial deals) are 
count variables, we ran instrument Poisson regressions to test the impact of government alliances on 
patenting activity and financial deals (see Table 5 in SI file). The results confirmed the significant 
positive association of an alliance with a governmental partner for patenting activity (β = 1.508, p-
value = 0.017) and financial deals (β = 1.574, p-value = 0.001).  
We further conducted PSM and tested the treatment effect on similar firms based on age size, 
and location. Our findings indicate significant Average Treatment Effects on the Treated (ATET) (p 
< 0.1) for patenting activity and for private financing deals (p < 0.01) (see Table 6 in the SI file). 
These findings again point to the importance of government partners for cleantech startups. Because 
PSM is only as good as the matching variables and potential confounding factors are not addressed, 
we only use it as a robustness check which should provide similar findings (Barth et al. (2007); Li 
(2012); Stone and Rose (2011)). 
However, while both empirical strategies are valuable as robustness checks because they 
provide similar findings, we cannot fully rule out potential selection concerns given the fact that we 
have a weak IV instrument and that PSM is dependent on the matching variables. We discuss the 
implications of the possible identification concerns in the limitations section. 
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5. Discussion 
Our study highlights the unique resources of government partners for cleantech startup 
innovation and ability to attract financial investments. In doing so, we focus on the value-
creation mechanisms of network resources from governments, universities and private 
research institutes, and private sector firms for startup outcomes. Overall, our findings 
contribute to the emerging research on entrepreneurial ecosystems and extend the alliance 
perspectives on innovation in the following ways. 
First, our findings complement existing research on entrepreneurial ecosystems with RDT that 
highlights the importance of alliances for partially absorbing dependencies of their environment. 
We apply RDT typologies of resources to the U.S. cleantech space and suggest an important 
theoretical lens for determining top or “anchor” partners that are associated with increased 
entrepreneurial innovation. RDT’s focus on organizations’ management in the context of external 
relations that ensures access to the most valuable resources offers us avenues to understand which 
type of partner possesses the most important physical, technological, and social resources that are 
associated with the highest levels of startup innovation and financial investments (Pfeffer and 
Salancik, 1978). Our findings highlight alliances with governmental organizations are important—
governmental partners hold critical technological and physical resources in the cleantech sector due 
to the longer term perspective for their research activities, substantial and energy specific research 
experience, physical equipment, and dedicated researchers. These resources are highly 
complementary to the abilities of startups in rapidly identifying and responding to market 
opportunities using jointly developed technologies. In general, greater resource complementarity of 
partners can widen power imbalance and weaken the outcome of the smaller alliance partner 
(Casciaro and Piskorski, 2005; Lavie, 2007). However, in the case of government organizations as 
partners, the tradeoff between resource complementarity and power imbalance delivers stronger 
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positive impact due to the government organization’s missing profit-orientation and their mandate 
to promote (energy) innovation and technology transfer. Combined with the reduced concerns of 
appropriability and opportunistic behavior, these unique characteristics make governments key, yet 
so far undervalued, partners. Our results on the value of alliances with governmental partners, i.e., 
licensing for financial investments and technology development for patenting activity, provide 
empirical support for the idea that governments can be valuable as partners for generating 
innovation and represent valuable signals of venture quality to potential investors.  
Second, our theory and empirical evidence enable important insights for RDT into the role of 
interorganizational alliances with partners that are characterized by high resource complementarity 
and low power imbalance to absorb the dependencies of the environment—an area that, unlike 
mergers & acquisitions (M&A), has been relatively understudied (Xia et al., 2016). Although our 
results suggest the strongest effects of startups’ alliances with governments, we also find that other 
partners—i.e., universities and private firms—are important for innovation. For universities, we 
find that licensing alliances are important for startup innovation. The results on licensing alliances 
likely result from the increased focus on improving technology transfer offices at major research 
universities which reduces friction for these alliance types (Siegel et al., 2007). Moreover, the larger 
diversity of university researchers when compared to government researchers may enable more 
tailored activities and technical competencies at least of a sub-set of the researchers, which are more 
closely related to those of startups (Sá and Litwin, 2011). The weaker effects of technology 
development alliances with universities than with governments could be explained by the following 
three reasons: (a) universities typically possess more limited resources for technology transfer 
offices to reduce information asymmetries (there are of course some notable exceptions like MIT 
and Stanford); (b) universities typically provide limited incentives for researchers to devote more 
time to work with the startups to make the most of the development partnership; and (c) universities 
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do not possess the wide-range of physical resources such as research and testing facilities or 
equipment that external firms with limited resources, especially startups, can use from 
governmental organizations (Koonin and Gopstein, 2011). For private sector firms, we find that 
technology development alliances contribute to increased innovation activities and financial 
investments, although to a lesser extent than technology development or licensing with 
governmental partners. While private sector investors might reward a technology development 
alliance with a private firm more than with a governmental partner (perhaps because of the 
perception that private firms may work on products that are more attuned to market needs and with 
more immediate returns), the unique technological expertise of governmental partners in some 
areas, combined with reduced power imbalance as well as concerns of appropriability and 
opportunistic behavior may explain the stronger innovation effects we detect for government 
alliances. Overall, these findings on the granular effects of alliance types with different ecosystem 
partners and the importance to consider resource complementarity and power imbalance resonates 
with recent calls from Guzman and Stern (2015) to focus on studying the “quality” of 
entrepreneurial outcomes rather than just the existence of startups and other actors for evaluating 
ecosystem effectiveness.  
Third, the granular perspective on network resources from governments for cleantech startup 
innovation complements existing research on the role of governments in financing R&D or through 
other technology-push or demand-pull policies (discussed in Section 1). Governments help create 
the market environment and demand for commercialization of products or services of startups 
through demand-pull policies, or they engage in financing of R&D through grants to help to 
overcome the underinvestment in energy research through technology-push (Bettencourt et al., 
2013; Choi and Anadón, 2014; Doblinger et al., 2016; Hoppmann et al., 2013; Howell, 2017; 
Nemet, 2009; 2018; Schmidt and Sewerin, 2018). We show that there is an important role for direct 
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technology-based alliances between governments and startups for increased startup innovation 
activity. This promotion of innovation in 1:1 alliances is additional and complementary to the 
technology-push and demand-pull incentives from governments. In this sense, the additional benefit 
of an alliance when compared to a quota obligation or other demand-pull policy incentives is that 
alliances only provide the outlined benefits (such as access to complementary resources) to the 
specific firms that are engaged in the alliance, whereas demand-pull policies typically work for all 
firms. Compared to the financing of R&D, the interaction and resource exchanges between the two 
partners in a technology development alliance is much more intense because of the interest in joint 
progressing of innovation or application. The differences between these policy incentives and 
alliances can further be explained by applying insights from TIS research (e.g., Bergek et al., 2008; 
Hekkert et al., 2007). Demand-pull and technology-push policies represent institutions that help 
steer effective system development and analyses of TIS, whereas the examined direct alliances 
between governments and startups relate to interactions between actors and the (organizational and 
network) resources (Musiolik et al., 2012). Our findings thus provide granular evidence on the 
importance of organizational and network resources for promoting cleantech innovation through 
interactions between startups and governments as actors in the system, and not between institutions 
and actors.   
Fourth, our study further contributes to research on interorganizational alliances by 
acknowledging that startups have more limited resources than other firms, and that collaborating 
with diverse partners is a resource intense endeavor. By building on the value-creation mechanisms 
of network resources provided by the extended resource-based view (Lavie, 2006, 2007), our 
findings help to understand how startups can benefit from direct access to complementary assets, 
synergies and legitimacy from network resources. These findings provide “fine-grained items for 
each of the possible knowledge channels” (Laursen and Salter, 2006: 147), enabling an evaluation 
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of the distinct benefits of alliances with governments through codified and tacit forms of knowledge 
exchange, possibilities of spillovers, and signaling effects. We find that access to more implicit and 
tacit knowledge sources from technology development alliances is more important for subsequent 
innovation activities than direct access to codified knowledge from public licensing. However, the 
latter is associated with an increased likelihood of attracting financial investments. Overall, this 
seems to reflect that investors reward a technology ‘in hand’ more than a technology development 
alliance. In addition, we find no significant innovation or signaling effects from procurement 
alliances with governmental partners. Our results do not reflect the implicit learning opportunities 
that have been claimed to be prevalent in procurement alliances (e.g., Malecki and Poehling, 1999; 
Von Hippel, 1978) potentially because governmental partners typically serve as customers and not 
as suppliers of technologies to startups (Bonvillian and Atta, 2011; Fuchs, 2010).  
Finally, by building on Lavie’s (2007) three value-creation mechanisms to understand how 
startups can access complementary resources, we follow the research call from Hillman et al., 
(2009) to advance RDT applications by using a synthesized approach between RDT and the 
resource-based-view for understanding the impact of alliances for increased startup innovation and 
financial investments. The application of this synthesized approach combined with the 
quantification of the relationship between startup alliances with different partners and startup 
outcomes offers important insights into “how obtaining control of critical resources offers firms 
competitive advantage and how developing resource interdependencies around critical resources 
affect the advantage derived from them” (Hillman et al., 2009: 1417). 
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6. Policy implications 
Our results inform policymakers in how governments and governmental organizations can 
effectively engage with startups and investors to promote the cleantech sector and engage in the 
entrepreneurial ecosystem through polices that extend beyond technology- and demand-pull.  
The most recognizable way in which governments support startups and small firms is through 
direct financing—for example, the U.S. SBIR is administered through agencies (such as DOE and 
DOD) that are mandated to allocate part of their budget to support innovative small firms that are 
relevant to their objectives (Audretsch, 2003; Howell, 2017). We show that, in addition to 
financing, government organizations such as the national laboratories can also directly partner with 
resource-constrained startups and support entrepreneurial activity. We show that in the U.S. 
cleantech sector licensing out technology to a startup can help the latter attract financial 
investments, and that developing technology jointly with a startup can support subsequent patenting 
activity by the startup. This leads to the identification of new technology opportunities and supports 
in shaping and steering the development of technologies in the energy sector towards meeting local 
environmental as well as global climate and sustainability goals. 
Previous work had identified the value of long-term and relatively stable funding and the 
importance of close integration of R&D and use (e.g., the support for military technologies in 
DARPA, the long-term research in Bell Labs) (Bonvillian, 2014; Narayanamurti and Odumosu, 
2016; Riordan and Hoddeson, 1998). In this sense, our analysis has important implications for 
government agencies themselves. In particular, it suggests the need to test additional incentives in 
government organizations active in energy innovation to support collaborative technology projects 
between centralized research organizations and decentralized, geographically dispersed firms (e.g., 
Martin, 2016). Such incentives may include investing more in technology transfer capabilities in 
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research organizations (Chan, 2015), entrepreneurs in residence programs, models based on the 
Cyclotron program at Lawrence Berkeley laboratory (Cyclontronroad, 2018), allowing government 
scientists to take temporary leave to work with a private firm (Anadon et al., 2016). Such additional 
incentives for joint development and technology transfer would reduce the information asymmetry 
and provide incentives to researchers. Government agencies can further gain vital inputs on 
applying unconventional approaches to solving current technological problems through these direct 
alliances with agile, flexible startups. This implies that government agencies could mimic the 
motivation and activities of large firms that engage with startups to escape the dominant paradigms 
and to creatively solve current problems (Benson and Ziedonis, 2009; Dushnitsky and Lenox, 
2005). Such an evaluation of how technology alliances with startups and additional incentives may 
leverage increased innovation on the side of the government organizations would represent an 
exciting avenue for future research.  
The benefits of additional efforts to promote alliances between government organizations and 
cleantech startups in the U.S. could further extend beyond geographical hubs—our findings show 
that alliances with strong innovation outcomes (i.e., technology alliances between startups and 
centralized governmental laboratories such as NREL in Golden, Colorado, see Figure 2) were 
outside of regional hubs such as Silicon Valley. Our results point to the value of collaborations 
between key government partners—especially those with expertise and resources in energy 
technologies—and small firms outside of regional ecosystems.  
The strong relationship between government technology alliances (when compared to other 
firms or universities) and improved cleantech innovation outcomes further informs current debates 
regarding proposals to cut funding for public research organizations in energy (Anadon et al., 
2017). Our findings on the importance of governmental licensing alliances to attract financial 
investments for startups complement the notion that government support for R&D in small firms 
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does not crowd-out private financing (Howell, 2017). This suggests that government organizations 
that devote resources to providing information on licensing options and to facilitating a smooth 
licensing process (Chan et al., 2017) can help counter the challenges of VC investment in cleantech 
startups (Gaddy et al., 2017).  
 
7. Conclusion and limitations 
This study examines the impact of different types of startup alliances with government 
organizations on the ability of startups to innovate and to attract financial investments when 
compared to other partners. Following the call of Laursen and Salter (2006; 2014), we separate the 
knowledge flows from technology development and licensing alliances with government 
organizations, research institutes and universities, and other firms. By evaluating the value-creation 
mechanisms of network resources from governmental partners for startups, this paper contributes to 
emerging research on entrepreneurial ecosystems and extends alliance perspectives on innovation. 
In addition, it makes meaningful contributions to ongoing policy discussions related to the role of 
governments in cleantech innovation. However, as with all empirical studies, ours is not without 
limitations.  
First, we study the impact of alliances on cleantech startups located only within the U.S. 
Nevertheless, our findings regarding the value of different types of partners and alliances provide a 
relatively complete picture of the cleantech startup sector: a large majority of cleantech startups are 
located in the U.S, our sample comprises the whole country, and we also consider U.S. startup 
alliances with global partners. However, we see exciting opportunities for future research to 
conduct comparative studies in a different country context. Second, our study is limited to the 
period from 2008-2012 that followed the financial crisis of 2007-2008, where government recovery 
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programs like the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 positively affected the 
cleantech sector and the number of VC transactions especially in hardware-type startups peaked 
before stabilizing (Bumpus and Comello, 2017). We included year-fixed effects to account for these 
changes in our empirical models. Given that we have no startup and alliance data before 2008, we 
cannot evaluate the extent to which a change from fewer resources in the 2004-2008 period to more 
resources in the 2008-2012 period translated into a larger or smaller importance of different types of 
alliances and partners. Thus, our results might not be fully applicable to periods of significantly less 
government and private funds. This is both a limitation of our work and a very promising avenue 
for future research. Also, beyond the changes during 2008 to 2012, the public funding context for 
energy R&D after 2012 until 2018 has not changed significantly (in spite of two attempts by the 
Trump administration to slash public funds for DOE energy R&D and the national laboratories, the 
U.S. Congress has chosen to keep funding for these programs largely constant (Anadon et al., 
2017)). Thus, our results continue to be valid and relevant from the perspective of public funding. 
There was a shift in VC investment after 2011 and an overall decline until 2013 (to approx. 1000 
million USD) in total global early-stage energy VC investment, followed by an increase (to over 
3000 million USD) after 2015 (Anadon et al., 2017; IEA, 2017). The lower funding period in the 
VC cleantech community could further have affected the need for firms to seek additional alliances 
after 2012, so if anything the centrality of government resources may have become more important 
for the value of alliances formed after 2012. Third, even though: (a) we included the incentives for 
why governments should not want to just pick winners; (b) we provided recent evidence that even if 
they wanted to pick winners, they might lack the ability to do so (Howell, 2017); and (c) we 
included two empirical strategies (IV and PSM) as robustness checks that further support our 
findings, there might still be concerns that some of the effects we estimate on the impact of 
partnering with governments on patenting activity and financial investments are driven by those 
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firms that have higher ‘ability.’ However, our results would also support the notion that 
governmental alliances are valuable for better startup outcomes. Given the high costs (time and 
effort) of partnering with government actors (Glauthier and Cohon, 2015), highly capable firms 
would not make the required investments in establishing such alliances if they would not be 
convinced about the value to their business. Furthermore, if only successful startups partner with 
government organizations, our results would be valuable as signals to other startups on where to 
focus their strategic efforts on. Given this possibility, we are cautious about the external validity of 
our results to firms that may not have identified the need to partner in the first place, which could be 
the subject of future research. 
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FIGURE 1: Theoretical model on three value-creation mechanisms through alliances for 
cleantech startups   
  
Power 
Imbalance
Startup 
outcome
Licensing 
alliance
Patenting
activity
Technology 
development
alliance
Financial 
investments
Government
Organizations
Private 
Sector
Firms
Universities & 
Private 
Research 
Organizations
(1) Codified knowledge
(3) Knowledge spillovers
(3) Legitimacy
Resource
Complementarity
Three primary
value-creation
mechanisms
H1
H3
H2
H4
High
HighLow
Low
Alliances with
the three
partner types
Partner 
characteristics
 
55 
Startup – Government 
2009  
 
  
 
Startup – Government 
2010  
  
Startup – Government 
2011  
 
Startup – Government 
2012 
  
 
 
FIGURE 2: Network Graphs  
Graph of startup (black) alliances with governmental partners (grey) weighted by the degree 
centrality from 2009 (top left) to 2012 (bottom-right). The alliances are technology-based 
(technology development or licensing) (red) or market-based (blue). The most central 
governmental partners with the highest degree centralities are labeled.  
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FIGURE 3: Total Network 
 
 
Graph of startup (black) alliances with other firms (grey) weighted by the degree centrality. The 
alliances are technology-based (red) or market-based (blue). 
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FIGURE 4: Average patenting activity per firm per sector  
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 FIGURE 5: Locational distribution of U.S. cleantech startups   
 
59 
TABLE 1: Overview of network resources from governmental organizations, 
universities, and firms available to startups to advance innovation in the cleantech sector 
 
 Physical resources Technological resources Social resources 
Governmental 
organizations  Unique scientific user facilities available to 
public and private sector  Laboratories   Specialized research 
equipment  Testing facilities  Demonstration facilities 
  Funding determined 
through a political 
appropriation process11  
 
(e.g., Bin-Nun et al., 2017; 
DOE, 2017; Koonin and 
Gopstein, 2011) 
 Experience: Dedicated 
energy research over several 
decades  Co-located knowledge in 
many areas of science and 
technology that can be 
mobilized  Knowledge creation abilities  Large groups of researchers 
(multiple laboratories)  Researchers with long-term 
experience   Relatively low staff impact 
turnover 
 
(e.g., Anadon, 2012; Bonvillian, 
2014; Westwick, 2003) 
 Mandate to promote 
(energy) innovation and 
contribute to societal 
benefit over a long 
timeframe (could be 
decades)  Mandate to help transfer 
technology to the 
private sector including 
commercialization  Longer funding periods 
enable long-term 
programs, roadmaps and 
goals 
 
(e.g., Anadon et al., 2016; 
Bin-Nun et al., 2017; 
Cohen and Noll, 1996; 
DOE, 2017) 
Universities and 
private research 
institutes 
 Laboratories   Specialized research 
equipment 
  Funding from grants from 
public funds, gifts, industry 
funded projects, and fees 
 
(e.g., American Academy of 
Arts and Sciences, 2013; 
Boccanfuso, 2010) 
 Experience in longer term 
energy related research over 
several years  Diversity of knowledge in 
many areas of science and 
technology  Knowledge creation abilities  Group of researchers at the 
scale of a laboratory  Higher staff fluctuation 
(aside from lead 
investigators) 
 
(e.g., American Academy of Arts 
and Sciences, 2013; Henderson 
et al., 1998; Jaffe, 1989) 
 Mandate to advance 
knowledge and to 
educate next generation   Publications are most 
relevant factors for 
scientific careers 
(knowledge 
commercialization often 
not a major promotion 
criterion)  Access to future staff 
(students) 
 
(e.g., American Academy 
of Arts and Sciences, 2013; 
Boccanfuso, 2010) 
Private sector  
firms   Production facilities  Complementary products 
and services 
  Funding determined by 
market and financial 
factors 
 
(e.g., Drucker, 1958) 
 Knowledge application 
abilities   Knowledge on market 
developments for market-
pull   Higher staff fluctuation 
 
(e.g., Drucker, 1958) 
 Profit orientation  Lower level of 
bureaucracy for 
collaboration and 
reporting compared to 
other partners 
 
(e.g., Drucker, 1958; 
Laursen and Salter, 2006) 
 
  
                                                           
11  We included funding in terms of cash available, which can be a physical (tangible) resource.  
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TABLE 2: Overview and explanation of the alliance types in the startup database 
 Alliance Type Example 
Technology-based 
alliances 
Technology 
development  
Arcos Silicon and Broadcom Corporation partnered to 
improve the interoperability of their power-over-ethernet 
(PoE) products. 
Sapphire Power has partnered with University of California, 
San Diego to demonstrate the viability of saltwater algae in 
the production of biofuels. 
Licensee Natcore has been granted a patent license agreement from the NREL to develop and commercialize a line of black 
silicon PV products.  
Additional forms 
of alliances 
(included as 
controls) 
 
Procurement or 
customer 
As part of a purchase agreement, Sustainable Green will 
become exclusive distributor of MagneGas fuel over a two-
year period in Pacific Northwest. 
Avista Corp. is buying the power produced by the Palouse 
Wind project under a 30-year power purchase agreement and 
will take delivery of the power through a direct interconnect 
to the Avista 230 kV Benewah-to-Shawnee transmission line. 
Licensor ABB has signed a licensing agreement with ECOtality to use ECOtality's technology for ABB's EV charging network. 
Project 
development  
Obsidian Renewables partnered with Swinerton Builders to 
develop the Black Cap Solar facility. 
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TABLE 3: Descriptive statistics of variables used in regression analysis 
 Mean S.D. 
1 Patenting activity 1.40 3.83 
2 Private financing deals 0.64 1.12 
3 Government technology alliance 0.03 0.19 
4 Government licensing alliance 0.00 0.06 
5 Government market alliance 0.02 0.17 
6 University/research technology alliance 0.05 0.25 
7 University/research licensing alliance 0.00 0.06 
8 University/research market alliance 0.01 0.09 
9 Inter-firm technology alliance 0.33 0.75 
10 Inter-firm licensing alliance 0.02 0.13 
11Inter-firm market alliance 0.52 1.34 
12 Prior patents 2.09 6.13 
13 Prior private financing deals 1.14 1.78 
14 Age 2.46 1.60 
15 Size (log) 2.92 1.54 
16 Location (log MSA density) 3.11 1.45 
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TABLE 4: Correlations of variables used in regression analysis (P-values in parentheses) 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
1 Patenting activity 1               
2 Private financing deals 0.191 1              
 (0.000)               
3 Government technology alliance 0.077 0.065 1             
 (0.001) (0.004)              
4 Government licensing alliance 0.045 0.056 0.113 1            
 (0.044) (0.013) (0.000)             
5 Government market alliance 0.006 0.003 -0.023 -0.008 1           
 (0.791) (0.879) (0.310) (0.714)            
6 University/research technology alliance 0.026 0.039 0.124 0.02 -0.012 1          
 (0.256) (0.085) (0.000) (0.379) (0.596)           
7 University/research licensing alliance 0.072 0.042 0.078 -0.004 -0.008 -0.011 1         
 (0.001) (0.064) (0.000) (0.866) (0.732) (0.625)          
8 University/research market alliance -0.007 -0.004 0.017 -0.004 -0.009 -0.012 -0.004 1        
 (0.751) (0.870) (0.439) (0.848) (0.698) (0.579) (0.858)         
9 Inter-firm technology alliance 0.148 0.184 0.056 0.067 0.063 0.106 -0.015 0.038 1       
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.013) (0.003) (0.005) (0.000) (0.514) (0.093)        
10 Inter-firm licensing alliance 0.083 0.061 -0.022 0.052 0.029 0.022 -0.008 -0.009 0.153 1      
 (0.000) (0.007) (0.320) (0.020) (0.195) (0.323) (0.738) (0.704) (0.000)       
11 Inter-firm market alliance 0.095 0.096 0.034 -0.007 0.118 -0.039 0.028 0.092 0.162 0.014 1     
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.137) (0.755) 0.000 (0.082) (0.219) (0.000) (0.000) (0.545)      
12 Prior patents 0.639 0.173 0.035 0.006 0.04 -0.009 0.032 0.036 0.15 0.058 0.13 1    
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.118) (0.797) (0.073) (0.689) (0.161) (0.109) (0.000) (0.010) (0.000)     
13 Prior private financing deals 0.268 0.456 0.091 0.037 0.038 0.011 0.066 0.001 0.248 0.104 0.176 0.357 1   
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.096) (0.092) (0.631) (0.003) (0.981) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)    
14 Age 0.138 0.105 0.077 0.047 0.056 -0.025 0.026 0.025 0.219 0.072 0.173 0.259 0.397 1  
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.037) (0.012) (0.273) (0.244) (0.275) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)   
15 Size (log) 0.261 0.242 0.031 0.028 -0.001 -0.05 -0.011 0.016 0.114 -0.029 0.192 0.26 0.348 0.21 1 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.188) (0.228) (0.982) (0.033) (0.637) (0.495) (0.000) (0.222) 0.000  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  
16 Location (log MSA density) 0.113 0.145 -0.036 -0.02 0.016 -0.003 0.047 0.028 0.037 0.000 0.082 0.089 0.151 0.013 0.089 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.109) (0.375) (0.489) (0.903) (0.037) (0.208) (0.099) (0.990) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.514) (0.000) 
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TABLE 5: Estimated coefficients from negative binomial regressions  
(P-values in parentheses; robust standard errors in brackets) 
 Patenting Activity Private Financing Deals 
 (1) (2) (3) (1)  (2) (3) 
 Controls Partner Type Partner and Alliance Controls  Partner Type Partner and Alliance 
Controls        Pre-sample1 patents / prior patents 0.070 0.076 0.078 0.005  0.003 0.002 
 (0.002) (0.001) (0.000) (0.389)  (0.631) (0.690) 
 [0.022] [0.023] [0.021] [0.006]  [0.006] [0.006] 
Prior private financing deals / pre-sample1  financing  0.191 0.172 0.152 0.292  0.293 0.292 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) 
 [0.031] [0.031] [0.030] [0.031]  [0.031] [0.030] 
Prior public financing deals 0.225 0.332 0.367 0.019  0.069 0.071 
 (0.118) (0.035) (0.028) (0.893)  (0.612) (0.602) 
 [0.144] [0.158] [0.167] [0.138]  [0.137] [0.137] 
Age 0.067 0.064 0.050 -0.112  -0.128 -0.134 
 (0.130) (0.149) (0.263) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) 
 [0.044] [0.044] [0.045] [0.028]  [0.029] [0.029] 
Size (log) 0.390 0.385 0.396 0.206  0.197 0.198 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) 
 [0.047] [0.049] [0.049] [0.029]  [0.029] [0.030] 
Location (log MSA density) 0.224 0.219 0.223 0.147  0.142 0.145 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) 
 [0.037] [0.037] [0.037] [0.026]  [0.026] [0.027] 
Partner Types        Government partner  0.284    0.143  
  (0.047)    (0.241)  
  [0.143]    [0.121]  
University/research partner  0.236    0.005  
  (0.089)    (0.965)  
  [0.139]    [0.106]  
Cleantech young firm partner  0.136    0.088  
  (0.188)    (0.178)  
  [0.104]    [0.065]  
Other inter-firm partner  0.036    0.065  
  (0.309)    (0.001)  
  [0.035]    [0.020]  
Nonprofit partner  -1.093 -1.174   -1.235 -1.149 
  (0.193) (0.113)   (0.022) (0.034) 
  [0.840] [0.740]   [0.539] [0.541] 
Other public partner  -0.032 0.065   -0.401 -0.293 
  (0.897) (0.812)   (0.019) (0.081) 
  [0.249] [0.276]   [0.171] [0.168] 
Partner and Alliance Types        Government technology alliance   0.552    0.248 
   (0.010)    (0.135) 
   [0.213]    [0.166] 
Government licensing alliance   0.651    0.935 
   (0.215)    (0.009) 
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   [0.525]    [0.358] 
Government procurement alliance   -0.046    -0.164 
   (0.888)    (0.433) 
   [0.327]    [0.209] 
University/research technology alliance   0.288    -0.031 
   (0.070)    (0.806) 
   [0.159]    [0.125] 
University/research licensing alliance   1.297    0.705 
   (0.001)    (0.082) 
   [0.400]    [0.405] 
University/research procurement alliance   -0.796    -0.227 
   (0.100)    (0.477) 
   [0.484]    [0.319] 
Inter-firm technology alliance   0.218    0.180 
   (0.000)    (0.000) 
   [0.059]    [0.040] 
Inter-firm licensing alliance   0.511    0.082 
   (0.087)    (0.685) 
   [0.298]    [0.203] 
Inter-firm procurement alliance   0.013    0.035 
   (0.754)    (0.174) 
   [0.041]    [0.025] 
Additional Alliances         Project development alliance   -0.079    0.029 
   (0.367)    (0.626) 
   [0.088]    [0.059] 
Licensor alliance   0.147    0.138 
   (0.639)    (0.463) 
   [0.314]    [0.187] 
lnalpha 1.213 1.189 1.151 -0.178  -0.229 -0.275 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.119)  (0.048) (0.022) 
 [0.065] [0.066] [0.068] [0.114]  [0.116] [0.120] 
Constant -2.721 -2.696 -2.661 -1.907  -1.864 -1.856 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) 
 [0.238] [0.245] [0.247] [0.161]  [0.163] [0.163] 
Sector FE YES YES YES YES  YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES  YES YES 
        
Observations 1,797 1,797 1,797 1,798  1,798 1,798 
Pseudo R2 (McFadden)2 0.0744 0.0770 0.0817 0.0645  0.0699 0.0739 
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000 
Log Lokelihood -2310.00 -2304.00 -2292.00 -1930.00  -1918.00 -1910.00 
   1   We changed the prior patent / prior financing variable to include only pre-sample patents / private financing deals to control for unobserved heterogeneity (e.g., Schilling and Phelps, 2007). 
2    We reported pseudo R2 as a means to compare model fit. We are aware of the fact that pseudo R2 does not provide similar information as the R2 reported after OLS.     
 
